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Abstract
James L. Anderson analyzed the conceptual novelty of Einstein’s theory of gravity
as its lack of “absolute objects.” Michael Friedman’s related concept of absolute ob-
jects has been criticized by Roger Jones and Robert Geroch for implausibly admitting
as absolute the timelike 4-velocity field of dust in cosmological models in Einstein’s
theory. Using Nathan Rosen’s action principle, I complete Anna Maidens’s argument
that the Jones-Geroch problem is not solved by requiring that absolute objects not
be varied. Recalling Anderson’s proscription of (globally) “irrelevant” variables that
do no work (anywhere in any model), I generalize that proscription to locally irrele-
vant variables that do no work in some places in some models. This move vindicates
Friedman’s intuitions and removes the Jones-Geroch counterexample: some regions of
some models of gravity with dust are dust-free, and there is no good reason to have
a timelike dust 4-velocity vector there. Eliminating the irrelevant timelike vectors
keeps the dust 4-velocity from counting as absolute by spoiling its neighborhood-by-
neighborhood diffeomorphic equivalence to (1, 0, 0, 0). A more fundamental Gerochian
timelike vector field presents itself in gravity with spinors in the standard orthonormal
tetrad formalism, though eliminating irrelevant fields might solve this problem as well.
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1 Introduction
James L. Anderson analyzed the novelty of Einstein’s so-called General Theory of Rel-
ativity (GTR) as its lacking “absolute objects” (Anderson, 1967; Anderson, 1971).
Metaphorically, absolute objects are often described as a fixed stage on which the dy-
namical actors play their parts. A review of Anderson’s quite precise definitions will
be useful. Absolute objects are to be contrasted with dynamical objects. The values
of the absolute objects do not depend on the values of the dynamical objects, but the
values of the dynamical objects do depend on the values of the absolute objects (Ander-
son, 1967) (p. 83). Both absolute objects and dynamical objects are, mathematically
speaking, geometrical objects or parts thereof; the importance of this requirement will
appear later.
Before absolute objects can be defined, the notion of a covariance group must
be outlined. Here it will prove helpful to draw upon the unjustly neglected work of
Kip Thorne, Alan Lightman, and David Lee (TLL) (Thorne et al., 1973); a useful
companion paper (LLN) was written by Lee, Lightman and W.-T. Ni (Lee et al.,
1974). The TLL definition differs slightly from Anderson’s in its notion of faithfulness.
According to TLL,
A group G is a covariance group of a representation if (i) G maps [kinemati-
cally possible trajectories] of that representation into [kinematically possible
trajectories]; (ii) the [kinematically possible trajectories] constitute “the ba-
sis of a faithful representation of G” (i.e., no two elements of G produce
identical mappings of the [kinematically possible trajectories]); (iii) G maps
[dynamically possible trajectories] into [dynamically possible trajectories].
(Thorne et al., 1973) (p. 3567)
One can now define absolute objects. They are, according to Anderson, objects
with components φα such that
(1) The φα constitute the basis of a faithful realization of the covariance
group of the theory. (2) Any φα that satisfies the equations of motion of the
theory appears, together with all its transforms under the covariance group,
in every equivalence class of [dynamically possible trajectories]. (Anderson,
1967) (p. 83)
Thus the components of the absolute objects are the same, up to equivalence under
the covariance group,1 in every model of the theory. It is the dynamical objects that
distinguish the different equivalence classes of the dynamically possible trajectories (p.
1There seems to be no compelling reason to require a covariance group instead of a mere covariance
groupoid, a structure that would be a group if it were meaningful to multiply every pair of elements.
Einstein’s equations on a background space-time, once one imposes a consistent notion of causality, have a
covariance groupoid that is not a group (Pitts and Schieve, 2004).
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84). One notices that the components of the absolute object need be the same, up to
equivalence under the covariance group, for all dynamically possible trajectories, not
all kinematically possible trajectories. Might this matter have gone otherwise? For
most purposes this choice makes no difference, because typically those objects whose
components are the same for all dynamically possible trajectories share the same feature
for all kinematically possible trajectories. This condition fails, however, in the context
of Rosen’s deriving the flatness of a metric using a variational principle with Lagrange
multipliers, as will appear below.
It has been asserted that the novel and nontrivial sense in which GTR is generally
covariant is its lack of absolute objects or “prior geometry” (Misner et al., 1973) (pp.
429-431). John Norton discusses this claim with some sympathy (Norton, 1992; Norton,
1993; Norton, 1995), though technical problems such as the Jones-Geroch dust and
Torretti constant spatial curvature counterexamples are among his worries (Norton,
1993; Norton, 1995). Anderson and Ronald Gautreau encapsulate the definition of
an absolute object as an object that “affects the behavior of other objects but is not
affected by these objects in turn.” (Anderson and Gautreau, 1969) (p. 1657) Depending
on how one construes “affects,” this summary might be serviceable, but only if used
very cautiously. On other occasions absolute objects are said to “influence” dynamical
objects but not vice versa (Anderson, 1971) (p. 169). Such terminology echoes Einstein
and implies that absolute objects violate what Anderson calls a “generalized principle
of action and reaction” (Anderson, 1967) (p. 339) (Anderson, 1971) (p. 169). Norton
has argued, rightly I think, that such a principle is hopelessly vague and arbitrary and
that it should not be invoked to impart a spurious necessity to the contingent truth that
our best current physical theory lacks them (Norton, 1993) (pp. 848, 849). One might
also doubt whether terms such as “affects,” “influence” and “act” adequately capture
what absolute objects typically do. These terms suggest that the dynamical objects
in question would have well-defined behavior if the absolute objects could somehow
be ‘turned off,’ so to speak (perhaps by replacing them with zero in the equations
of motion), and that if the absolute objects were ‘turned on’ again, they would alter
the well-defined behavior of the dynamical objects in much the way that an applied
electric field alters the motion of a charged particle. But in important examples,
such as Newtonian physics or special relativity, turning off many or all of the absolute
objects destroys the theory: the equations of motion become degenerate or meaningless.
The absolute objects do not so much alter an otherwise happy situation as provide
conditions in which the dynamical objects can have well-defined behavior. Perhaps the
stage metaphor for absolute objects is deeper than it seemed: presumably actors could
put on a play on a stage consisting of a rubbery sheet or a giant pillow, or perhaps
act in mid-air while falling freely, but it is easier to act on a firm wooden stage. Thus
the claim that absolute objects have some defect knowable a priori may be taken too
seriously. The fact that it is even possible to do without them, as in Einstein’s theory,
3
should be something of a surprise.
In Anderson’s framework, an important subgroup of a theory’s covariance group
is its symmetry group (Anderson, 1967) (pp. 84-88). One first defines the symmetry
group of a geometrical object as those transformations that leave the object unchanged.
If the transformations are infinitesimal space-time mappings, then the Lie derivative of
the geometrical object with respect to the relevant vector field vanishes for symmetries.
The symmetry group of a physical system or theory—Anderson makes no distinction
between them here—is
the largest subgroup of the covariance group of this theory, which is simul-
taneously the symmetry group of its absolute objects. In particular, if the
theory has no absolute objects, then the symmetry group of the physical
system under consideration is just the covariance group of this theory. (p.
87)
Thus, roughly speaking, the fewer absolute objects a theory has, the more of its co-
variance transformations are symmetry transformations. For the example of a massive
real scalar field obeying the Klein-Gordon equation in flat space-time in arbitrary co-
ordinates, the covariance group is the group of diffeomorphisms, while the symmetry
group is the 10-parameter Poincare´ group corresponding to the ten Killing vector fields
of Minkowski space-time. For a massive real scalar field coupled to gravity in GTR, the
covariance group is again the diffeomorphisms. The symmetry group is also the diffeo-
morphisms, because any diffeomorphism leaves the set of absolute objects invariant,
trivially, because there are no absolute objects. The fact that the space-time metric
in GTR + massive real scalar field has no symmetries in general, though quite true,
plays no explicit role in determining the symmetry group of the theory because the
space-time metric is dynamical rather than absolute.
Finding Anderson’s definition obscure, Michael Friedman amended it in the interest
of clarity (Friedman, 1973; Friedman, 1983). Friedman takes his definition to express
Anderson’s intuitions, so the target of analysis is shared between them. As it turns
out, Friedman has made a number of changes to Anderson’s definitions, most of which
seem to have received little comment by him or others, so some comparison will be
worthwhile.
First, though Friedman’s and Anderson’s equivalence relations are laid out some-
what differently, a key difference between them is that Friedman’s equivalence relation,
which he calls d-equivalence, comprises only diffeomorphism freedom (Friedman, 1983)
(pp. 58-60), not other kinds of gauge freedom such as local Lorentz freedom or elec-
tromagnetic or Yang-Mills gauge freedom, in defining the covariance group. But local
Lorentz freedom is a feature of the standard version of Einstein’s GTR + spinors, for
example. Anderson calls such groups besides diffeomorphisms “internal groups” (An-
derson, 1967) (pp. 35, 36). I find no argument for Friedman’s excluding internal groups
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from the relevant equivalence relation, so perhaps he was unaware of this departure
from Anderson’s work. The goal is to distinguish physical sameness from conventional
variation in descriptive fluff. Because internal groups involve descriptive fluff as much
as diffeomorphisms do, it seems that Anderson was more successful than Friedman
on this point. The role of internal groups in Anderson’s work seems to have escape
Norton’s notice (Norton, 1993) (pp. 847, 848).
Second, Friedman’s mathematical language is less general than Anderson’s and fails
to accommodate some useful mathematical entities that Anderson’s older component
language permits. Anderson, a working physicist, knows what sorts of mathematical
structures physicists actually use and need, while Friedman restricts his attention to
that narrower collection of entities that all modern “coordinate-free” treatments of
gravitation or (pseudo-)Riemannian geometry presently discuss, namely tensors and
connections, but not, for example, tensor densities (though a few recent differential
geometry texts actually do treat densities of arbitrary weight (Spivak, 1979; Okubo,
1987)). Tensor densities are useful and might be essential in some applications. In the
literature on modern nonperturbative canonical quantization of gravity, with Ashtekar’s
new variables and the like, tensor densities are used routinely. Some authors write den-
sities in a way that makes their weight manifest: a weight 2 density has tildes over it,
a weight −1 density has a tilde below it, etc. Moreover, the use of a densitized lapse
function has proven useful in 3+1-dimensional treatments of the initial value prob-
lem2 in GTR and the dynamical preservation of the constraint equations (Jantzen,
2004; Anderson and York, 1998). Perhaps these uses of densities are matters of con-
venience rather than necessary, because one might simulate tensor densities of integral
weights using tensors, perhaps with great heaps of indices (totally antisymmetric on
various sets of three or four at a time), and then invent a notation for multiple 4-forms,
multi-vectors, and the like to avoid writing such indices. In practice using densities
evidently is easier for many authors. An analogous procedure has not been found (to
my knowledge) and might be impossible for general non-integral weight tensor densi-
ties; it is unclear what a quantity with a third of an index or pi indices would mean.
But tensor densities of fractional weight are routinely used in the conformal-traceless
decomposition of Andre´ Lichnerowicz and James York in solving GTR’s initial value
constraints in numerical general relativity (York, 1972; Brown, 2005). The conformal
part of a metric, which has a fixed determinant (usually ±1) when the components
are treated as a matrix, is a tensor density with dimension-dependent and typically
fractional density weight, while the conformal factor that converts a conformal metric
into a full metric is a scalar density. Thus densities are useful, though perhaps not
2It is now customary in numerical general relativity to call the problem of inferring later or earlier states
of a system from initial data the “Cauchy problem,” while the term “initial value problem” is reserved for
the procedure of solving the constraint equations to get a set of initial data. This latter sort of problem
exists only for constrained theories like GTR or Maxwell’s electromagnetism.
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essential, in unimodular variants of GTR (discussed in (Unruh, 1989; Earman, 2003)),
for example. Densities with irrational weights are, if not essential, at least very useful
in work on massive variants of Einstein’s GTR (Ogievetsky and Polubarinov, 1965;
Pitts and Schieve, 2005). Thus Friedman’s mathematical language does not accom-
modate quantities that physicists use and perhaps require. Friedman’s mathematical
language is also inadequate to express the techniques used by V. I. Ogievetski˘i and I.
V. Polubarinov in their atypical treatment of spinors coupled to gravity using a “square
root of the metric” (Ogievetski˘i and Polubarinov, 1965). This spinor formalism might
be useful in preventing the timelike leg of the orthonormal tetrad, which typically used
with spinors, from counting as an unwanted absolute object. Hermann Weyl protested
in 1920 against early clumsy efforts at component-free formalisms “which are threat-
ening the peace of even the technical scientist” (Weyl, 1952) (p. 54). Fortunately,
recently some authors have accommodated densities in coordinate-free form (Fatibene
et al., 1997; Fatibene and Francaviglia, 2003). Presumably a coordinate-free version of
any geometric object could be defined if the need arose.
Third, while Friedman considers variously rich and spare versions of what is intu-
itively one theory (Newtonian gravity) and states a methodological preference for spare
theories, his treatment lacks the firm resolve of Anderson’s demand that “irrelevant”
variables be eliminated. This requirement is also imposed by TLL (Thorne et al., 1973)
and discussed by John Norton (Norton, 1993). One can readily adopt the Andersonian
proscription of irrelevant variables to express Friedman’s intuitions about “natural”
choices of variables (Friedman, 1983) (p. 59) in relation to the Jones-Geroch dust
counterexample.
A fourth difference pertains to the notion of standard formulations of a theory.
Anderson argues (somewhat confusingly) that theories should be coordinate-covariant
under arbitrary manifold mappings; this move seems to be offered as a substantive
claim rather than a conventional choice. More understandably, TLL stipulate that the
standard form of a theory be manifestly coordinate-covariant. Friedman, by contrast,
takes as standard a form in which the absolute objects, if possible, have constant com-
ponents (Friedman, 1983) (p. 60) and so have limited coordinate freedom. Friedman
implies that one can always choose coordinates such that the absolute objects (a) have
constant components and (b) thus drop out of the theory’s differential equations, which
then pertain to the dynamical objects alone. However, (a) is falsified by the counterex-
ample of (anti-) de Sitter space-time as a background (Rosen, 1978; Logunov et al.,
1991) for some specific curvature value. These space-times of constant curvature, at
least for a fixed value of the curvature, satisfy Anderson’s and Friedman’s definitions of
absolute objects, but the components of the metric cannot be reduced to a set of con-
stants. What holds for space-time curvature also holds for spatial curvature. Anderson
makes some effort to identify the ‘correct’ or best formulation of a theory, a task taken
up in more detail by TLL (Thorne et al., 1973). The latter authors’ “fully reduced
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generally covariant representation” of a theory, unlike Friedman’s “standard formula-
tion” (p. 60), retains the full coordinate freedom by leaving the absolute objects as
world tensors (or tensor densities, connections, or whatever sort of geometric objects
they are). Friedman’s expectation that absolute objects be expressible using constant
components is too strong to apply in every example. (b) is falsified by the example
of massive versions of Einstein’s theory (Ogievetsky and Polubarinov, 1965; Freund
et al., 1969; Babak and Grishchuk, 2003; Pitts and Schieve, 2005). After a lull from
the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s, massive variants of gravity have received considerable
attention from physicists lately, especially particle physicists. In those theories where
the background space-time metric is flat, its components can be reduced to a set of
constants globally by a choice of coordinates, but the background metric still does not
disappear from the field equations because it appears in them algebraically, not merely
differentially as Friedman apparently assumed tacitly. Especially because (a) is false,
the Thorne-Lee-Lightman fully reduced generally covariant formulation is therefore
preferable to Friedman’s standard formulation, which fails to exist in some interesting
examples. However, if one’s goal is more historical, so that Newtonian gravity and
special relativity without gravity are the main theories of interest, then Friedman’s
standard formulation suffices to illustrate the role of the Galilean and Poincare´ groups,
respectively.
Friedman’s expectation that the components of absolute objects could be reduced
to constants in general, though incorrect, usefully calls attention to the role (or lack
thereof) of Killing vector fields and the like in analyzing absolute objects. If the
(anti-) de Sitter space-time examples show that constancy of components is too strict
a criterion, the next best thing is to have a maximal set of 10 Killing vector fields in
four space-time dimensions, whether commuting as in the flat space-time case or not as
in the (anti-) de Sitter case. One could generalize in various ways (Kramer et al., 1980).
Because absolute objects need not be metric tensors, the general notion is not Killing
vector fields, but generalized Killing vector fields, fields such that the Lie derivative of
the absolute objects vanishes. Certainly some notion of constancy is one of the core
intuitions that one has about absolute objects. Thus all standard examples of absolute
objects will likely have a fair number of generalized Killing vector fields. In Anderson’s
terminology, most theories will have fairly large symmetry groups. Typically at least
a 7-parameter family of space- and time-translations and spatial rotations will be in
the symmetry group, as in classical mechanics (Goldstein, 1980). In GTR (including
suitable matter fields), the lack of absolute objects implies a vast symmetry group. This
large group of all diffeomorphisms as symmetries of the absolute objects, in turn, leads
to an embarrassment of riches concerning local conservation laws, albeit noncovariant
and not unique (Anderson, 1967) (pp. 425, 426). From this fact follows the so-called
nonlocalizability of gravitational energy. The expectation of time-translation invariance
excludes most Robertson-Walker metrics, so this criterion might be invoked to exclude
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a counterexample of Norton’s (Norton, 1993) (p. 848). The most typical and plausible
examples of absolute objects do not apply forces that violate conservation laws; those
that do, might well be called miraculous. Norton’s main point in this example (which
is inspired by Torretti), that one can collect various constant curvature spaces together
in a single theory and thereby not satisfy Anderson’s criterion for absolute objects, will
be discussed below.
2 Jones-Geroch Counterexample and Friedman’s
Reply
With a clear grasp of absolute objects in hand, one can now consider the Jones-Geroch
counterexample that claims that the 4-velocity of cosmic dust counts, absurdly, as an
absolute object by Friedman’s or Anderson’s standards. Friedman concedes some force
to this objection made by Robert Geroch and amplified by Roger Jones, here related
by Friedman:
. . . [A]s Robert Geroch has observed, since any two timelike, nowhere-vanishing
vector fields defined on a relativistic space-time are d-equivalent, it follows
that any such vector field counts as an absolute object according to [Fried-
man’s criterion]; and this is surely counter-intuitive. Fortunately, however,
this problem does not arise in the context of any of the space-time theories
I discuss. It could arise in the general relativistic theory of “dust” if we
formulate the theory in terms of a quintuple 〈M,D, g, ρ, U〉, where ρ is the
density of the “dust” and U is its velocity field. U is nonvanishing and thus
would count as an absolute object by my definition. But here it seems more
natural to formulate the theory as a quadruple 〈M,D, g, ρU〉 where ρU is
the momentum field of the “dust.” Since ρU does vanish in some models,
it will not be absolute. (Geroch’s observation was conveyed to me by Roger
Jones, who also suggested the example of the general relativistic theory of
“dust.”. . . ) (Friedman, 1983) (p. 59)
Here D is the torsion-free covariant derivative compatible with g. Other sources, includ-
ing what Roger Jones reported hearing from Robert Geroch, indicate a qualification
to local diffeomorphic equivalence of nonvanishing timelike vector fields (Jones, 1981b)
(pp. 167, 168) (Jones, 1981a; Trautman, 1965) (p. 84) (Wald, 1984) (p. 18) (Dodson
and Poston, 1991) (pp. 198-200). In any case nothing in my argument will depend
on global versus merely local equivalence between arbitrary neighborhoods. Jones also
distinguishes the local diffeomorphic equivalence of nonvanishing timelike vector fields,
which holds in general, from the (local) diffeomorphic equivalence of their covariant
derivatives of various orders, which typically does not hold.
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Below I will argue that Friedman’s response is nearly satisfactory, though it has two
weaknesses as he expressed it. First, the statement “ρU does vanish in some models”
ought to have said “ρU does vanish in some neighborhoods in some models” to show
that he is considering only genuine models of GTR + dust (in which dust vanishes in
some neighborhoods in some models), rather than some models with (omnipresent?)
dust and some degenerate models which nominally have dust but actually have no
dust anywhere. The latter would seem to be a cheat. As it stands, the reader is
left to wonder whether such a cheat is doing important work for Friedman (though
John Norton correctly read Friedman’s proposal as “relying . . . on the possibility that
ρ vanishes somewhere” (Norton, 1993) (p. 848)). Clearly some models with dust
have neighborhoods lacking dust, and it is these models which will prevent the dust 4-
velocity from constituting an absolute object. Second, Friedman’s unfortunate notation
ρU suggests that the mass current density (which I will call J µ) is logically posterior
to ρ and an everywhere nonvanishing timelike U µ. If so, then one has not eliminated
the absolute object after all. If a timelike nowhere vanishing U µ exists in the theory,
then it is absolute even if ρUµ vanishes somewhere and so is not absolute. Thus the
relevance of Friedman’s use of ρUµ is left obscure. Instead one can take Jµ to be the
fundamental variable, while the timelike U µ is a derived quantity defined wherever
ρ 6= 0. Alternatively, one can take U µ to be meaningful everywhere (and perhaps
primitive), but vanishing where there is no dust. If Friedman had said that J µ or Uµ
“does vanish in some neighborhoods in some models,” then these two infelicities would
have been avoided. Perhaps these expository imperfections led Roberto Torretti to
judge Friedman’s reply ad hoc (Torretti, 1984) and John Norton to call it “a rather
contrived escape” (Norton, 1993) (p. 848). Once these problems are removed, the
merit of Friedman’s intuition shines brightly.
Below I shall review more discussion of this counterexample in the philosophical
literature. Various neglected items from the physics literature will shed light on long-
standing philosophical debates about absolute objects. Using the term “variational” for
objects which are varied in an action principle (Gotay et al., 2004), one can safely follow
Anderson in making “absolute” and “dynamical” mutually exclusive, while leaving
open the connection between absoluteness and nonvariationality. It will be shown that
there exist theories with variational absolute objects, at least if one does not exclude
Rosen’s variational principle as somehow illegal. Such a theory can be obtained using
Rosen’s trick to fulfill Maidens’s claim that the absolute special relativistic metric could
be obtained variationally. However these theories arguably violate Anderson’s demand
to eliminate redundant variables. A natural extension of the proscription of irrelevant
variables serves to eliminate the Jones-Geroch counterexample: the dust 4-velocity U µ
does not count as an absolute object for GTR + dust because U µ does not exist where
there is no dust.
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The final section will consider briefly some further issues that face the Anderson-
Friedman absolute objects program. Among these are the neglected issues of the clock
fields of parametrized theories and, more importantly, spinor fields coupled to gravity.
While a timelike nowhere vanishing vector field does not exist in every model for the
theories that Friedman considers, avoiding such an entity when coupling a spinor field
to gravity is widely rumored to be impossible. Thus the connection between spinors
and absolute objects is of considerable importance. While absolute objects and dynam-
ical objects are mutually exclusive, it is useful to have the third category of confined
objects as well (Thorne et al., 1973); these three categories are mutually exclusive
and exhaustive, evidently. Some entities that seemed intuitively absolute but do not
satisfy Anderson’s definition fit into the category of confined objects. Also Roberto
Torretti’s example of a theory with spatial metrics of various constant curvatures will
be considered briefly.
3 Hiskes’s Redefinition of Absoluteness, Maid-
ens’s Worry, and Rosen’s Answer in Advance
Anne Hiskes proposed amending the definition of absolute objects so that no field varied
in a theory’s action principle would be regarded as absolute (Hiskes, 1984). Such a
move makes use of what prima facie seems to be a true generalization about absolute
and dynamical objects. This intuition was shared by the master. Anderson wrote:
In addition to the differences between absolute and dynamical objects dis-
cussed in Section 4-3 there is another important difference that appears to
be characteristic of these two types of objects. The equations of motion
for the dynamical objects can often be derived from a variational principle,
especially if these objects are fields. On the other hand, it appears to be the
case, although we can give no proof of the assertion, that the equations of
motion for the absolute objects do not have this property.. . . In the following
discussion we will assume that the equations of motion for the dynamical
objects of a theory follow from a variational principle and that those for the
absolute elements do not. (Anderson, 1967) (pp. 88, 89)
Thus Anderson suspected that most or all dynamical objects are variational, while no
absolute object is variational. Similar intuitions are manifest in the TLL and LLN
papers (Thorne et al., 1973; Lee et al., 1974). Such a requirement also appears in their
notion of being “Lagrangian-based” (Thorne et al., 1973) (p. 3573). Recently John
Earman has found it convenient to use “absolute” to mean non-variational. (Earman,
2003) Anderson was quite sensitive to the possibility of reformulating what intuitively
seems like the same theory using various different sets, and indeed increasingly large
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sets, of variables in an action principle (Anderson, 1967) (section 4.2). Unlike Hiskes,
he strove to define a unique correct formulation that gave the expected answers.
More recently, Anna Maidens has entertained the idea that Hiskes’s redefinition
could be deployed to remove the Jones-Geroch counterexample (Maidens, 1998). If
absolute objects must be nonvariational, while the dust 4-velocity is variational, then
the dust 4-velocity is not absolute. Following Hawking and Ellis (Hawking and Ellis,
1973), Maidens indicates how the equations for the timelike vector field can be derived
from a variational principle.3 However Maidens is also sensitive to the large variety of
choices of variables and even the number of field components in an action principle for
what intuitively counts as a single theory. Thus she expected such a use of Hiskes’s
redefinition to fail, because it eliminates the Jones-Geroch counterexample at the cost
of introducing a new one. More specifically, Maidens has suggested that there might
be some way to reformulate special relativistic theories such that the flat metric, which
surely ought to count as absolute, is varied in the action principle. If that could be
done, then Hiskes’s definition of absolute objects would prove to be too strict (the
opposite problem from what the Jones-Geroch example suggests about Friedman’s),
because it fails to count the metric tensor of special relativity as an absolute object.
(Maidens presumably should envision a weakly generally covariant formulation of spe-
cial relativity, though her notation is far from clear on that point.) “At this stage,
however, we find a fly in the ointment, for its turns out that given suitable starting
assumptions we can derive the Lorentz metric from an action principle.” (Maidens,
1998) (p. 262) Supporting such claims would involve actually displaying a suitable
Lagrangian density whose Euler-Lagrange equations give the desired results or else
citing a source where such work had been done. Surprisingly, she fails to do either one.
Success would involve finding an action principle for which the flatness of the metric
holds for all models (her case (c)), not just some (her case (a), p. 265). A bit later
she finds that “it is an open question as to whether the metric of special relativity is
derivable from an action principle.” (p. 266) Two pages later she once again claims
that “some of the physically necessary fixed background, e.g. the Lorentz metric, can
also be derived from an action principle.” (p. 268) It is not easy to harmonize these
fluctuating statements.
Fortunately Maidens’s expectation that the flatness of a metric (for all models) can
be derived from a variational principle is in fact correct. The question was resolved by
3One notices that Hawking and Ellis use a fluid variational principle with constrained variations, not the
more familiar unconstrained variations. In some respects this is a disadvantage, though Schutz and Sorkin
observe that it keeps one closer to the physical variables (Schutz and Sorkin, 1977). They also observe that
in many cases, including this one, one can eliminate the constraints on the variation (not to be confused
with constraints in the sense of gauge theories (Sundermeyer, 1982)) using Lagrange multipliers. It seems
to me that John Ray’s variational principle might be preferable in the present context, because it involves
varying Uµ itself and uses unconstrained variations (Ray, 1972).
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Nathan Rosen’s in the 1960s (Rosen, 1966; Rosen, 1973). He used an action principle
involving a Lagrange multiplier field with 20 components, a trick recently used also by
Rafael Sorkin (Sorkin, 2002). Thus requiring absolute objects to be nonvariational gives
an excessively strict definition, so the Jones-Geroch counterexample is not adequately
addressed thereby. Some objects that should count as absolute can be variational, as
Maidens expected. Rosen includes the following term in an action principle (after a
change in notation to ηµν for the metric in question, which is a priori arbitrary apart
from the signature) to force ηµν to be flat:
S =
∫
d4x
√−ηRρµνσ [η]P ρµνσ . (1)
This term is intended as a supplement to the action for a special relativistic theory,
within which now ηµν would be subject to variation as well. P
ρµνσ, a tensor with
the same symmetries as the Riemann tensor for ηµν , serves as a Lagrange multiplier.
Varying P ρµνσ immediately yields the flatness of ηµν . Varying ηµν takes more work and
gives an equation of motion especially involving the second derivatives of P ρµνσ. That
equation is not needed here. Rosen seems to make secret use of the Euler-Lagrange
equation from P ρµνσ to discard terms involving Rρµνσ[η] in his equations 10, 11, and
12; if so, then his equation 12 is not an “identity” as he claims. Alternately, he might be
taking the metric to be flat before the variation but curved after it, as Sorkin proposes
(Sorkin, 2002), if that is an intelligible alternative.4 As was noted above, Anderson’s
requiring component equality (up to equivalence under the covariance group) only
for dynamically possible trajectories is relevant here. Using Rosen’s trick, one has a
geometric object such that its components agree for dynamically possible trajectories
(on-shell, as physicists say) but not for kinematically possible trajectories (off-shell),
because the metric is not flat for all kinematically possible trajectories.
Anderson briefly states that one must remove irrelevant variables from the theory
under analysis. He writes:
It is possible that a subset of the components of the [geometrical object
characterizing the kinematically possible trajectories of the theory] do not
appear in the equations of motion for the remaining components and fur-
thermore can be eliminated from the theory without altering the structure
of its equivalence classes. Such a subset is obviously irrelevant to the the-
ory. We shall assume, therefore, that no subset of the components of [that
geometrical object] is irrelevant in this sense.” (Anderson, 1967) (p. 83)
Likewise TLL exclude the category of irrelevant variables (Thorne et al., 1973) (p.
3569). Anderson observes that
4It is perhaps worth noting that varying P ρµνσ gives an equation of motion for ηµν and varying ηµν gives
an equation of motion primarily for P ρµνσ . Thus one should avoid expressions like “the equations of motion
for ηµν” or “the equations of motion for P
ρµνσ” due to their ambiguity.
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one can always construct a hierarchy of theories all of which have the same
equivalence-class structure in the sense that the equivalence classes of these
theories can be put into one-to-one correspondence with each other. Two
theories of such a hierarchy will differ both with regard to the mathematical
quantities that describe their respective [kinematically possible trajectories]
and their respective covariance groups. However, the set of mathematical
quantities that describe the [kinematically possible trajectories] of a given
theory in such a hierarchy will contain, as subsets, those of each theory that
precedes it in the hierarchy. Likewise, its covariance group will contain, as
a subgroup, the covariance group of each preceding theory.. . .
The question then arises as to which theory of a hierarchy one should use
to describe a given physical system. The answer rests, of course, in the
final analysis, on the measurements that one can make on the system. It
is necessary that each quantity used to describe the [kinematically possible
trajectories] of a theory must, at least in principle, be measurable. (Ander-
son, 1967) (p. 81)
Similar thoughts appear elsewhere in the text (pp. 306, 340). This requirement of
observability, an unfortunate whiff of verificationism, presupposes that all the physics
resides in the field equations.5 But typically, fields that do useful work are observ-
able, and Anderson’s requirement of observability, if not entirely on target, at least
emphasizes the importance of excluding idle fields, such as P ρµνσ appears to be.
While Rosen’s trick vindicates Maidens’s assertion that building nonvariational-
ity into the notion of absolute objects is unsuccessful, Anderson appears to have the
resources to exclude Rosen’s trick as a form of cheating. Anderson’s prohibition of
irrelevant variables appears to exclude theories making use of Rosen’s trick, because
the dynamical evolution of the Lagrange multipliers P ρµνσ has no effect on any other
fields, whether gravitational or matter. P ρµνσ appears to do nothing useful by Ander-
son’s standards. Making ηµν variational and yet absolute could perhaps be useful in
5This last claim Anderson elsewhere implicitly appears to contradict when he considers boundary condi-
tions (p. 75) and suggests (using “furthermore” on p. 83), surprisingly, that there could exist fields that do
not appear in other fields’ equations of motion, but which help to determine the structure of the theory’s
equivalence classes. As it happens, recent work on field formulations of Einstein’s equations provides an
example: the flat metric does not appear essentially in the field equations, but it plays a role in the bound-
ary conditions, topology, and the notion of gauge transformations (Pitts and Schieve, 2004). Boundary
conditions are important in string theory as well (Braga et al., 2005). Thus Anderson is overly hasty in
eliminating the background metric after deriving Einstein’s equations in flat space-time (Anderson, 1967)
(pp. 303-306) in the fashion of Kraichnan (Kraichnan, 1955). While Kraichnan’s use of a background metric
in no way requires that quantization occur by covariant perturbation theory, historically the two projects
have been linked in the minds of many. Anderson critiqued perturbative approaches to Einstein’s equations
in response to a paper by Richard Arnowitt (Arnowitt, 1963).
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that it lets one treat the theory readily using the existing constrained dynamics for-
malism (e.g., (Sundermeyer, 1982)), which has not made much room for nonvariational
fields. Making ηµν variational also allows one to define a conserved symmetric stress
energy tensor without using the formal trick of the Rosenfeld approach, in which one
replaces the flat metric by a curved one for taking a functional derivative and then re-
stores flatness afterwards (Deser, 1970). Whether Rosen’s trick or the Rosenfeld trick
is preferable is open to discussion, but the Andersonian elimination of the Lagrange
multipliers as irrelevant is at least a defensible view.
Where does this dialectic leave us? Maidens proposed and rejected using Hiskes’s
redefinition of absolute objects to exclude the Jones-Geroch counterexample to Fried-
man’s account of absolute objects. Maidens’s missing proof was supplied in advance
by Rosen. But Rosen’s trick seems not to count against Anderson’s version of the intu-
ition that absolute objects are nonvariational, because Anderson wisely has criteria for
eliminating irrelevant variables. Does it follow that Anderson’s intuition, in the larger
context of his project that excludes irrelevant variables, is vindicated? That is, if we
accept Anderson’s definitions and proscriptions, should we also accept his intuition
that fields are variational if and only if they are dynamical? As it turns out, Ander-
son’s generalization survives this alleged counterexample but might be threatened by
another in which all fields are variational but there is still an absolute object. I have
in mind parametrized theories (Sundermeyer, 1982; Kucharˇ, 1973; Schmelzer, 2000;
Arkani-Hamed et al., 2003; Norton, 2003; Earman, 2003), in which preferred coordi-
nates are rendered variational. One often calls the results “clock fields.” Perhaps some
uses of clock fields could be excluded as irrelevant—not because the fields themselves
are irrelevant, but because perhaps their variationality is. On the other hand, if clock
fields are used to satisfy an appropriate notion of causality in bimetric theories like
massive variants of Einstein’s equations (Pitts and Schieve, 2005; Pitts and Schieve,
2004; Schmelzer, 2000), then their variationality is relevant. Parametrized theories
require more discussion than is appropriate here, however. Spinor fields also pose a
difficulty, one which I intend to resolve on another occasion.
4 Eliminating Local Irrelevance Excludes the
Geroch-Jones Vector Field
If Maidens’s proposed and rejected use of Hiskes’s redefinition is set aside for violation
of Anderson’s prohibition of redundant variables, then the Jones-Geroch counterex-
ample still remains to be addressed. Now it turns out that Anderson’s and TLL’s
proscription of irrelevant variables, if it does not quite remove the Jones-Geroch coun-
terexample, at least inspires a gentle amendment that does the job. This amendment
seems especially appropriate after one notices that TLL replace (Thorne et al., 1973)
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(p. 3566) Anderson’s notion of geometrical object (Anderson, 1967) (pp. 14-16) with
Andrzej Trautman’s notion of a geometric object (Trautman, 1965). Presumably both
notions aim to capture the same intuition.
Given the relative inaccessibility of Trautman’s lectures, it will be worthwhile to
quote his definition of geometric objects in detail:
Let X be an n-dimensional differentiable manifold.. . . [S]ince tensors are
not sufficient for all purposes in geometry and physics, [sic] for example
scalar densities are not tensors, to avoid having to expand definitions and
theorems whenever we need a new type of entity, it is convenient to define
a more general entity, the geometric object, which includes nearly all the
entities needed in geometry and physics, so that definitions and theorems
can be given in terms of geometric objects so as to hold for all the more
specialized cases that we may require.
Let p ∈ X be an arbitrary point of X and let {xa}, {xa′} be two systems of
local coordinates around p. A geometric object field y is a correspondence
y : (p, {xa}) → (y1, y2, · · · yN ) ∈ RN
which associates with every point p ∈ X and every system of local coordi-
nates {xa} around p, a set of N real numbers, together with a rule which
determines (y1′ , · · · yN ′), given by
y : (p, {xa′}) → (y1′ , · · · yN ′) ∈ RN
in terms of the (y1, y2, · · · yN) and the values of [sic] p of the functions
and their partial derivatives which relate the coordinate systems {xa} and
{xa′}.. . . The N numbers (y1, · · ·yN ) are called the components of y at p
with respect to the coordinates {xa}. (Trautman, 1965) (pp. 84, 85)
Trautman then notes that spinors are not geometric objects. He also notes that some
objects that are not themselves geometric objects are nonetheless parts of geometric
objects. Pace Friedman’s nonstandard usage (Friedman, 1983) (p. 359), the class
of geometric objects is not exhausted by tensors and connections. Geometric objects
were considered with great thoroughness by Albert Nijenhuis (Nijenhuis, 1952). A
more recent treatment of them using modern differential geometry has been given by
Marco Ferraris, Mauro Francaviglia, and Cesare Reina (Ferraris et al., 1983).
The reader will notice that Trautman’s geometric objects are defined at every point
in the space-time manifold. That fact is of special relevance for the dust example,
because it implies that if a dust 4-velocity timelike unit vector field U µ is used as
a variable in the theory, then a dust 4-velocity timelike unit vector must be defined
at every point in every model, even if no dust exists in some neighborhoods in some
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models. Here one recalls Anderson’s and TLL’s call for the elimination of irrelevant
variables; Friedman also recognizes the value of eliminating surplus structure. It is
not clear that existing notions of irrelevance apply strictly to the present case. The
dust 4-velocity is locally irrelevant, not globally irrelevant, one might say. Perhaps
the authors had in mind fields that satisfy equations somewhat like the Klein-Gordon
equation as their primary examples, as physicists often do; for such fields irrelevance
is likely to be global. But now that the question is raised, it does seem clear that
wherever there is no dust, there ought not to be a dust 4-velocity timelike unit vector
either—at least not if the task at hand is testing theories for absolute objects.
There seem to be three initially plausible alternatives concerning the dust 4-velocity
where the dust has holes in some model. First, one might retain a timelike 4-velocity
vector even in holes in the dust, while expecting the 4-velocity values in the dust holes
to be mere gauge fluff. It is noteworthy that at least some perfect fluid variational
principles in the physics literature yield timelike unit vector 4-velocities even where
there is no fluid (Ray, 1972). Perhaps mathematical convenience commends this option,
though I have shown that Ray’s variational principle can be modified to lack a timelike
4-velocity in holes in the fluid. Presumably one could show that the value of a timelike
4-velocity vector is in fact gauge fluff in dust holes by using the Dirac-Bergmann
constrained dynamics technology (Sundermeyer, 1982), though one might run into
technical challenges with changes of rank or with the noncanonical Poisson brackets
that can appear in fluid mechanics (Morrison, 1998). In any case, the timelike dust
4-velocity in dust holes has no physical meaning, yet leads one to conclude that the
theory has an absolute object. Clearly any absolute object whose existence is inferred
only by using physically meaningless quantities is spurious. If one allowed physically
meaningless entities into a theory while testing for absolute objects, then one could
take any theory and construct an empirically equivalent theory with as many absolute
objects as one wants. One could concoct a version of GTR with Newton’s absolute
space, for example. To permit such a procedure is just to give up Anderson’s program of
analyzing the uniqueness of GTR, because analysis involves trying to get the intuitively
known right answer as a consequence of some criteria. Anderson and TLL call for
the elimination of irrelevant variables for just this sort of problem. One might call
the entities that they reject “globally irrelevant variables” because such entities play
no role at any space-time point in any model. The Jones-Geroch example shows, I
conclude, that one must also exclude “locally irrelevant variables,” entities that play
no role at some space-time points in some models.
The two remaining options avoid this spurious absolute object in different ways.
One option is to take the mass current density Jµ to be the primitive variable and
regard Uµ and the dust density ρ as derived. Then ρ is defined by ρ =
√−JµgµνJν .
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The 4-velocity Uµ is naturally defined by
Uµ =
Jµ√−JνgναJα
,
so Uµ is only meaningful where the denominator ρ is nonzero. That consequence
is plausible on physical grounds and blocks the Jones-Geroch counterexample. The
theory is thus formulated using a quadruple 〈M,D, g, J〉, not Friedman’s quadruple
〈M,D, g, ρU〉 or the quintuple 〈M,D, g, ρ, U〉. In some models J µ vanishes at some
space-time points in some models of GTR + dust, so U µ is undefined in such cases.
Neither Jµ nor Uµ is a Gerochian nowhere vanishing timelike vector field for all mod-
els. By contrast, the mass current density Jµ, which is equal to ρUµ where ρ 6= 0,
automatically vanishes where there is no dust and is continuous at the transition from
dust to vacuum. Thus Friedman’s suggestion that it is more “natural” to use the mass
current density, once freed from the two infelicities noted at the beginning, is seen to
be very reasonable.
The other option is to take Uµ to be meaningful but vanishing in those places in
certain models where the dust has holes.6 Although the dust 4-velocity exists every-
where, it vanishes in some places in some models, so not every neighborhood in every
model has dust 4-velocity that is gauge-equivalent to (1, 0, 0, 0). Anderson’s definition
of absolute object requires that, for any component φα of an absolute object in a theory,
“[a]ny φα that satisfies the equations of motion of the theory appears, together with all
its transforms under the covariance group, in every equivalence class of [dynamically
possible trajectories].” (Anderson, 1967) (p. 83) Even if we drop Anderson’s require-
ment of global equivalence in favor of Hiskes’s local equivalence, the dust 4-velocity
does not count as absolute. In dust-filled regions in a model, the dust 4-velocity is dif-
feomorphic (at least in a neighborhood) to (1, 0, 0, 0), but in dust holes the 4-velocity
is diffeomorphic to (0, 0, 0, 0) instead. Thus U µ, like Jµ, is not an absolute object.
One might tolerate as harmless the surplus structure embodied in the vanishing dust
4-velocity vectors, though the mathematical discontinuity of the vector field makes it
difficult to defend this option on grounds of mathematical convenience.
If one chooses to restrict one’s attention to models of GTR + dust that do have
dust everywhere and always, such gerrymandering is simply changing the subject to
consider a different theory. If one takes a semantic view of theories, then restricting
attention to such a proper subset of models is just to discuss some new theory besides
GTR + dust, namely GTR + omnipresent dust. The new theory GTR + omnipresent
dust has an absolute object. But why shouldn’t it? Surely no one has well founded
intuitions to the contrary. In any case, the theory of interest was GTR + dust, not
GTR + omnipresent dust. Anderson anticipated the fact that one could consider a
6One need not commit oneself to Jµ as primitive and Uµ as derived. I am indebted to Don Howard for
insightful probing about choices of primitive variables, as well as a suggestion concerning this paper’s title.
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proper subset of models for which some field would count as absolute without counting
as absolute for the full set of models. He wrote:
We should perhaps emphasize that we are discussing here universal abso-
lute objects, which must appear in the description of every [dynamically
possible trajectory] of our space-time description. It is quite possible that,
for a subclass of [dynamically possible trajectories], one or more dynamical
objects satisfy the criteria of Section 4-3 and so play the role of absolute
objects for those [dynamically possible trajectories].. . . The existence of such
special subclasses of [dynamically possible trajectories] as those discussed
above does not, of course, constitute a violation of the principle of general
invariance as we have formulated it. Only the existence of universal absolute
objects would do so. (Anderson, 1967) (pp. 339, 340)
Thus Anderson reminds us that absolute objects are universal, not (so to speak) provin-
cial like the dust 4-velocity. While the dust 4-velocity constitutes an absolute object
for the theory GTR + omnipresent dust, it does not constitute an absolute object for
GTR + dust due to the failure of universality. Thus Friedman’s intuition, as modified
above, is vindicated. The alleged Jones-Geroch counterexample fails to count as an
absolute object for GTR + dust and thus fails to undermine Friedman’s analysis after
a slight amendment using Andersonian resources.
One might summarize Friedman’s reply, as amended above, as follows: Geroch’s
merely mathematical vector field is irrelevant and eliminable because it does no phys-
ical work, while Jones’s dust application of the vector field does physical work but
violates the condition of being meaningful and everywhere nonvanishing in all models
and so violates the diffeomorphic equivalence needed for absoluteness. At this stage a
summary might be useful. Physics literature previously unappreciated by philosophers
of physics has been shown to shed light on the Jones-Geroch counterexample to Fried-
man’s (and likely Anderson’s or TLL’s) definition of absolute objects. An old result
from Rosen vindicates Maidens’s claim that Hiskes’s redefinition of absolute objects
could not be used to eliminate the Jones-Geroch counterexample without generating a
new counterexample. The neglected but valuable papers by TLL and LLN and some in-
frequently attended parts of Anderson’s book proscribe irrelevant variables, a fact with
important consequences. This proscription can be used to exclude Rosen’s trick for
deriving flat space-time from a variational principle. Then Anderson’s generalization
that absolute objects are variational and vice versa would seem to be rehabilitated, at
least provisionally, though the clock fields of parametrized theories pose further ques-
tions. If variationality cannot be invoked to remove the Jones-Geroch counterexample,
then some new move is required. Again the Anderson-TLL proscription of irrelevant
variables is helpful, in spirit if not in letter. Excluding locally irrelevant values of the
field Uµ, which purports to be the 4-velocity field of dust, would imply that U µ is
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undefined wherever the dust vanishes, while the mass current J µ vanishes there. Al-
ternatively, Uµ and Jµ both vanish there. Either way, GTR + dust fails to have an
everywhere nonvanishing timelike vector field that exists in all models. Thus a slight
amendment of the Anderson-Friedman tradition using the Andersonian opposition to
irrelevant variables eliminates the Jones-Geroch counterexample.
5 Spinors, Confined Variables, and Conjectures
Addressing the Jones-Geroch vector field does not clear the air of every possible ques-
tion about the Anderson-Friedman project. I close with a collection of features of some
or all spacetime theories that could use further attention and conjectures regarding
what form that attention might take. Above two further potential counterexamples to
Anderson’s generalization were mentioned: the timelike leg of an orthonormal tetrad in
a theory of gravity coupled to a Dirac spinor, and the clock fields of parametrized the-
ories. Clock fields in parametrized theories, if not irrelevant, apparently will count as
absolute objects despite being variational. Such a result is not unreasonable, but some
details need careful attention, which I hope to provide on another occasion. Before
discussing the spinor-tetrad issue, it is worthwhile to consider Anderson’s treatment
of spinors of the Dirac equation in a gravitational field (pp. 358-360). Anderson en-
tertains the worry that γµ might be an absolute object in flat spacetime, in fact one
with a symmetry group smaller than the Poincare´ group (though in this context γµ is
not a vector under arbitrary coordinate transformations, so it is not eligible to be an
absolute object by Anderson’s standards, it would seem). Turning to curved spacetime,
Anderson avoids using an orthonormal tetrad by using variable Dirac matrices γµ sat-
isfying γµγν + γνγµ = 2gµνI. What follows is a formalism with an internal symmetry
group (apparently global) unrelated to the group of spacetime mappings. However, the
implicit relationship between γµ and gµν leaves obscure what a suitable action prin-
ciple might be for deriving the Einstein-Dirac equations and what variables it would
involve. Thus one can hardly even test Anderson’s formalism for absolute objects; his
treatment of spinors is just incomplete. By contrast the spinor-tetrad formalism avoids
such difficulties.
One often reads that coupling a spinor field to gravity requires an orthonormal
tetrad (Weinberg, 1972; Deser and Isham, 1976; Fatibene and Francaviglia, 2003).
However, the threat of a counterintuitive absolute object then arises. Given both local
Lorentz and coordinate freedom, one can certainly bring the timelike leg into the com-
ponent form (1, 0, 0, 0) at least in a neighborhood about any point, which is enough for
absoluteness by Hiskes’s standards. (Aligning the tetrad with the simultaneity hyper-
surfaces is known as imposing the time gauge on the tetrad (Deser and Isham, 1976).)
Unlike the dust case, there cannot be any spacetime region in any model such that
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the timelike leg of the tetrad vanishes. Thus GTR coupled to a spinor field using an
orthonormal tetrad gives an example of a Gerochian vector field: nowhere vanishing,
everywhere timelike, gauge-equivalent to (1, 0, 0, 0), and allegedly required to couple
the spinor and gravity and thus not irrelevant. Like clock fields, the timelike tetrad
leg also appears to be both variational and absolute. The spinor-tetrad example seems
rather more serious a problem for definitions of absolute objects than the Jones-Geroch
cosmological dust example, because the spinor field is surely closer to being a funda-
mental field than is dust or any other perfect fluid. Spinors (actually vector-spinors for
spin 3
2
) are also required in supergravity, where internal and external symmetries are
combined. On another occasion I hope to explain how to remove irrelevant variables
here and thus avoid this unexpected absolute object.
Some other features of spacetime theories that fit awkwardly with Anderson’s and
Friedman’s accounts might be addressed using TLL’s third category of confined vari-
ables (Thorne et al., 1973), which does not overlap with the absolute objects but has
some similarities. “The confined variables are those which do not constitute the basis
of a faithful representation of the [manifold mapping group]” (Thorne et al., 1973) (p.
3568), which means (p. 3567) that there exist two distinct elements of the manifold
mapping group that produce identical mappings of the confined variables. TLL list
universal constants as examples of confined objects. Indeed it is clear that structures
that do not change at all under coordinate transformations are confined objects. Some
other examples of things unaffected by coordinate transformations that come to mind
include the identity matrix, the Lorentz matrix diag(−1, 1, 1, 1), fixed Dirac γµ matri-
ces, Lie group structure constants, and Oswald Veblen’s “numerical tensors” (though
Veblen’s “tensors” include tensor densities). The numerical tensors are the Kronecker
δµν symbol, which is trivially a world tensor, and the Levi-Civita totally antisymmet-
ric  symbol with values 1, −1, and 0; these values are the components of both a
contravariant tensor density of weight 1 and a covariant tensor density of weight -1
(Veblen, 1933; Anderson, 1967; Spivak, 1979). It has been suggested by Harvey Brown
that the signature of the metric is importantly like an absolute object (Brown, 1997;
Maidens, 1998). If the signature were an absolute object in the strict sense, then
GTR would have an absolute object, contrary to Anderson’s diagnosis of the novelty
of GTR. Anderson’s and Friedman’s works perhaps have no category for expressing
this immutable, externally prescribed nature of the metric signature, because absolute
objects are supposed to be geometric objects (tensor fields and the like). The fact
that the spacetime metric signature is unaffected by diffeomorphisms suggests that it
counts as a confined variable in the richer TLL taxonomy. The requirement that ab-
solute objects form a faithful realization of the theory’s covariance group is something
that TLL carry over from Anderson (Anderson, 1967) (p. 83), though they have dif-
ferent definitions of faithfulness (Thorne et al., 1973) (p. 3577), as was noted above.
Another issue worthy of consideration is the global topology of spacetime, which seems
20
rather neglected in the literature on absolute objects, apart from the work of Hiskes
(Hiskes, 1984) and Friedman (Friedman, 1983). The topology of spacetime is certainly
untouched by diffeomorphisms, so it also might be treated as a confined variable. Thus
the TLL amendments to Anderson’s project already accommodate some intuitively
absolute-like features of spacetime theories that do not fit the traditional definitions of
absolute objects.
Finally, one might consider Roberto Torretti’s example (Torretti, 1984) of a theory
of modified Newtonian kinematics in which each model’s space has constant curvature,
but different models have different values of that curvature. Because every model’s
space has constant curvature, such a theory surely has something rather like an ab-
solute object in it. Though contrived, this example is relevantly like the cases of de
Sitter or anti-de Sitter background metrics of constant curvature that are sometimes
discussed in the physics literature (e.g., (Rosen, 1978; Logunov et al., 1991)), where
one often lumps together space-times with different values of constant curvature. The
failure of the metrics to be locally diffeomorphically equivalent for distinct curvature
values prevents such theories from satisfying Anderson’s, Friedman’s, or TLL’s def-
inition of an absolute object. It is unclear that even the resources of the TLL and
LLN papers accommodate the Torretti example under any category. Perhaps absolute
objects cannot be analyzed adequately, but still one knows an absolute object when
one sees it.7 On the other hand, sometimes progress is made by modifying vague ques-
tions (about fixed background structure in this case) until they admit precise answers.
Perhaps the problem lies not in the Andersonian tradition, but in the claim that these
models with different curvature values are best regarded as part of the same theory. If
Anderson’s project is sufficiently attractive, might not the notion of a scientific theory
be revisable to accomodate that project? Maybe Torretti’s theory is gerrymandered,
the result of taking the union of several related but naturally distinct sets of models;
similar comments could be made regarding Norton’s modification of Torretti’s example
to Robertson-Walker metrics (Norton, 1993) (p. 848). Perhaps a syntactic view of the-
ories as defined by (nonarbitrary?) postulates, rather than a semantic view of theories
as (arbitrary?) collections of models, would be helpful here. One might regard models
with different spatial curvatures as belonging to different theories that are instances of
a common theory schema.8 This question should be connected with discussions of the
status of those universal constants of nature that are “put in by hand” in the laws of
nature, if such constants exist (Duff et al., 2002). It might also be worth considering
whether models with differing space-time topology should be regarded as belonging to
different theories in a common theory schema.
7I thank Harvey Brown for defending such a view in discussion.
8I thank Don Howard for suggesting the relevance of the syntactic vs. semantic debate and supplying a
helpful vocabulary here.
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6 Conclusion
The discussion of various supposed counterexamples to the Anderson-Friedman project
reveals that progress has been made toward having all and only those intuitively abso-
lute entities count technically as absolute objects. The Jones-Geroch counterexample
is resolved by the exclusion of locally irrelevant mathematical entities. The Torretti
counterexample might perhaps best be viewed as gerrymandered. Other absolute-like
entities find a home in the TLL category of confined objects. Further work on spinors
will likely show that orthonormal tetrads are partly irrelevant in GTR + spinors and so
do not bring in a Gerochian nonvanishing timelike vector field to count, absurdly, as an
absolute object. One would hope for a similar outcome for supergravity. Parametrized
theories are also worth some attention.
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